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British foreign policy is in danger of strategic drift. A series of international crises 
in recent years, from the Arab Spring to the Syrian civil war and the Ukrainian 
revolution, have been met with confused responses lacking a sense of overarching 
national goals or a systematic consideration of how to achieve them. Upon 
entering office in 2010, Foreign Secretary William Hague set out the idea that 
the UK was now operating within a networked world and argued that it should 
exploit the possibilities of this environment to further British interests.1 He criti-
cized New Labour for falling into ‘a chasm of their own making between rhetoric 
and action in large areas of foreign policy’ and suggested that the coalition govern-
ment would bring a more strategic sensibility to its policy-making.2 However, 
four years on, problems remain. Schisms are developing between the public and 
elites on important issues such as when it is appropriate to use military force 
abroad and whether the UK should remain a member of the European Union.
The difficulty, as many analysts of foreign policy have pointed out, is that 
consideration of strategy is heavily reliant upon the identity ascribed to the UK 
as a global actor.3 Hague defined strategy as ‘some sense of what we are trying 
to achieve as a country over a longer period’. 4 Yet, as the Public Administration 
Select Committee (PASC) has argued: ‘Strategic aims cannot be set or adjudicated 
without an articulated account of who “we” are and what we believe, both about 
ourselves and the world.’5 Hague’s discussion of British identity in his strategic 
speeches amounted to a few brief sentences on UK democracy and the rule of law.6 
1 William Hague, ‘Britain’s foreign policy in a networked world’, speech given on 1 July 2010, https://www.
gov.uk/government/speeches/britain-s-foreign-policy-in-a-networked-world--2, accessed 13 April 2014.
2 William Hague, ‘Britain’s values in a networked world’, speech given at Lincoln’s Inn, London, 15 Sept. 
2010, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-britains-values-in-a-networked-world, 
accessed 10 April 2014.
3 Patrick Porter, ‘Why Britain doesn’t do grand strategy’, RUSI Journal 155: 4, 2010, p. 10; House of Lords/House 
of Commons, Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, First review of the National Security Strategy 
2010, 27 Feb. 2012, HC 1384, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtnatsec/265/265.
pdf, pp. 18–19, accessed 10 April 2014; PASC, Who does UK national strategy? Further report, 25 Jan. 2011, http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubadm/713/71303.htm, para. 7, accessed 10 April 
2014. See also Christopher Hill, ‘Tough choices’, World Today, April 2010, pp. 11–14. Strategy is understood 
here to mean thinking about how, given their means, actors can achieve their policy goals; see Steven Jermy, 
Strategy for action (London: Knightstone, 2011), p. 18.
4 PASC, Who does UK national strategy?, Ev. 16.
5 PASC, Who does UK national strategy?, para. 7. 
6 Hague, ‘Britain’s values’.
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The coalition’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) was promoted as 
‘a fundamental reappraisal of Britain’s place in the world’;7 however, the subse-
quent report was criticized for lacking any substantial analysis of the UK’s place 
in the world and how this linked with the domestic political community.8 This 
shortcoming is very much in keeping with UK foreign policy-makers’ traditional 
reluctance to reflect on questions of national identity.9 The PASC has suggested 
that this needs to change, and that unstated assumptions ‘need to be exposed so 
that they may be tested and, if necessary, altered’.10 
Two key factors driving the need for some reflection on British identity and 
how the nation wishes to act abroad are the impact of austerity and the rise of new 
poles of power in the international structure. With regard to austerity, a report for 
the Institute for Public Policy Research in 2009 asserted: ‘Most serious commen-
tators now believe the situation cannot continue as it is … fundamental choices 
are necessary. The attempt to maintain the full spectrum of conventional combat 
capabilities at current scale has produced acute strains on resources and, increas-
ingly, on operational effectiveness.’11 Similarly, a joint parliamentary committee 
report on the National Security Strategy argued in 2010 that: ‘Given the UK’s 
low economic growth rate … we believe it is wholly unrealistic not to expect 
any diminution in the UK’s power and influence in the medium and long term.’12 
Commentators predicted that the UK, facing a reduced capacity to act, would 
have to change its behaviour and draw back from international commitments.13 In 
doing so, the country would have to become a very different kind of actor, with 
a different self-identity.
At the same time, the economic rise of Brazil, China, India and a newly asser-
tive Russia is predicted to bring a ‘historic shift of relative wealth and economic 
power from West to East’ in coming decades.14 Longstanding assumptions about 
Britain’s status and leadership in global forums, about alliance patterns and about 
policy behaviour are under scrutiny. In response, parliamentarians assert that 
national strategy ‘should be based on a realistic vision of the UK’s future place 
in the world, which will both shape, and be shaped by, the UK’s interests and 
objectives’.15 A genuinely strategic approach to foreign policy-making therefore 
requires policy-makers to ask: what kind of an actor does the United Kingdom 
want to be in international politics? 
7 Ministry of Defence (MoD), Strategic Defence and Security Review (London, 2010).
8 Defence Committee, ‘Towards the next Defence and Security Review’, Seventh Report, 18 Dec. 2013, http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/197/19705.htm; Church of England Arch-
bishops Council, ‘Submission to the Defence Select Committee Inquiry’, Feb. 2011, http://www.church 
ofengland.org/media/1312982/post%20sdsr%20submission%20cofe.doc, both accessed 10 April 2014.
9 John Coles, Making foreign policy: a certain idea of Britain (London: John Murray, 2000), p. 11; Peter Mangold, 
Success and failure in British foreign policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 5, 68. A rare example of open 
reflection was provided by the 1995 FCO conference on ‘Britain in the world’.
10 PASC, Who does UK national strategy?, para. 7.
11 IPPR, Shared responsibilities: a national security strategy for the UK (London, 30 June 2009), p. 47.
12 House of Lords/House of Commons, Joint Committee on the NSS, First review, para. 29.
13 Stryker McGuire and Christopher Werth, ‘Forget the Great in Britain’, Newsweek International 17 Aug. 2009.
14 National Intelligence Council, Global trends, 2025: a transformed world (Washington DC: US Government 
Printing Office, 2008), p. 1.
15 House of Lords/House of Commons, Joint Committee on the NSS, First review, pp. 18–19.








outh user on 03 February 2020
Strategizing Britain’s role in the world
561
International Affairs 90: 3, 2014
Copyright © 2014 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2014 The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
This question has periodically surfaced in British foreign policy debates under 
the guise of consideration of Britain’s role in the world.16 However, the term ‘role’ 
is often used loosely and rarely leads to a full appraisal of the range of identity 
and policy positions available to Britain’s policy-makers.17 This article aims to 
address this gap in the literature by offering a framework for understanding how 
states orient themselves in global politics by playing roles. The roles states adopt in 
international relations are shaped by domestic self-identities and political pressures 
as well as the expectations of other states and actors globally.18 The pattern of roles 
that any one state adopts can be seen as amounting to a role orientation. By analysing 
a range of orientations the UK could adopt towards the international environment, 
the article aims to open up space for policy-makers to weigh the costs and benefits 
of each and consider making strategic choices between them. In the process, it will 
also shed light on how identity, strategy and policy actions interrelate.
Role theory
References to national roles are commonplace in foreign policy rhetoric.19 
However, the concept is used to describe a range of behaviours, identities or 
status positions.20 The term derives from sociology and its core assumption is that 
participants in a social system adopt roles, rather like actors in a play, according 
to a script based on certain prescribed identities and behaviours.21 Examples of 
roles in the British foreign policy lexicon might include ‘bridge’, ‘pivotal power’, 
‘beacon of democracy’ or ‘reliable ally’ of the United States.22 Saying these roles 
are ‘prescribed’ could give the impression that policy is structurally determined—
a view seemingly reinforced on a material basis by Naomi Wish’s suggestion that 
‘a nation’s foreign policy behaviour is in large measure a product of its national 
capabilities or attributes’.23 Yet Wish actually intends to convey a more circular 
16 BBC, ‘Viewpoints: what should the UK’s future global role be?’, 24 Sept. 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-24202354; Editorial, ‘The UK’s world role: Great Britain’s greatness fixation’, Guardian, 25 Jan. 2010, http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jan/25/britain-world-role-europe-us, both accessed 10 April 2014.
17 For a critique of the search for a national role, see Christopher  Hill, ‘Britain’s elusive role in world politics’, 
British Journal of International Studies 5: 3, Oct. 1979, pp. 248–59. For an excellent defence of role theory, see 
Cameron G. Thies, ‘Role theory and foreign policy’, unpublished paper, May 2009, http://myweb.uiowa.
edu/bhlai/workshop/role.pdf, accessed 10 April 2014.
18 Jack Holland, Selling the war on terror: foreign policy discourses after 9/11 (London: Routledge, 2012).
19 Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, ‘Contested roles and domestic politics: reflections on role theory in foreign 
policy analysis and IR theory’, Foreign Policy Analysis 8: 1, 2012, p. 18.
20 Philippe G. Le Pestre, ed., Role quests in the post-Cold War era: foreign policies in transition (London: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1997). Le Pestre cites at least six distinct applications of the concept, including role 
as a contribution or function (e.g. the US role in the Middle East peace process), as an influence or impact 
(e.g. Russia’s role in negotiating an alternative to conflict with Syria in 2013), as ‘expected behaviour based on 
certain rules’ (akin to norms), as a part in a larger script or course of action, as policy decisions, or as rank/
status (p. 4). In using the term ‘role theory’, I am not denying the plurality of voices within this branch of 
enquiry, simply selecting the categories most useful to analysing the strategic choices facing the UK.
21 Lisbeth Aggestam, ‘Role theory and European foreign policy: a framework of analysis’, in Ole Elgstrom and 
Michael Smith, eds, The European Union’s roles in international politics (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 12.
22 See Oliver Daddow and Jamie Gaskarth, eds, British foreign policy: the New Labour years (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2011), pp. 13–16.
23 Naomi B. Wish, ‘National attributes as sources of national role conceptions’, in Stephen G. Walker, ed., Role 
theory and foreign policy analysis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 96. This belief is apparent in a 
British context in the continual emphasis on Britain’s island geography as imbuing the national consciousness 
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process, in which material attributes feed into conceptions of national roles in 
a way that then shapes behaviour, which in turn affects national attributes (see 
figure 1).
Indeed, one of the primary benefits of a role-based approach to foreign policy 
analysis is that it gives a more nuanced and dynamic account of identity formation 
and policy behaviour than purely individualist or structuralist accounts. Roles 
come with expectations about behaviour that shape actions. These role expecta-
tions or ‘role prescriptions’ derive from a state’s membership of institutions and 
its interactions with external actors and domestic audiences, and condition what 
policies are deemed appropriate and how they are received.24 For instance, at the 
institutional level, membership of NATO prescribes the role of ‘reliable ally’ 
when a fellow NATO member is attacked; interactions with other states may lead 
to the role of ‘bridge’ or ‘mediator’; domestic political groups might call for either 
withdrawal from global commitments, towards the role of ‘isolate’, or for the state 
to be a more active ‘defender of the faith’ or ‘liberator’ in support of domestic 
values.25 Governments that deviate from the ‘script’ can face punishment or at the 
very least confusion from domestic audiences or other international actors. Yet 
there is also scope for policy-makers to be creative in their choice of roles and how 
they interpret or enact them.26 Consequently, role theory provides for agency 
in foreign policy, even as it recognizes that it is bounded by social expectations.
As role theory has developed, analysts have devised a complex understanding of 
how this concept can be used to trace the policy-making process. At the broadest 
level of a state’s disposition towards its external environment, Margaret Hermann 
describes ‘role orientations’ that provide an overarching  rationale and pattern to 
how states interact with others.27 The examples offered are: expansionist, active 
with a sense of separation from the continent: see e.g. L. Colley, Britons: forging the nation, 1707–1837 (London: 
Pimlico, 1994), p. 17.
24 Aggestam, ‘Role theory and European foreign policy’, pp. 14–18. 
25 These role conceptions are derived from Kal Holsti, ‘National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy’, 
International Studies Quarterly 14: 3, 1970, pp. 233–309.
26 Elgstrom and Smith, ‘Introduction’, in Elgstrom and Smith, eds, The European Union’s roles, p. 5.
27 In the original framework, Hermann is discussing how individual statespeople orient themselves to the 
international realm; however, since many of the subjects were autocratic leaders, their personal orientations 
were, by extension, those of the state. This article transfers the concept from individuals to the UK as a state 
actor, encompassing both individuals and the governments to which they belong.
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Figure 1: Wish’s role cycle
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independent, influential, mediator/integrator, opportunist, developmental.28 To 
this list might be added the role of isolate. Underlying each is a different primary 
goal or driver; these are, respectively, power; autonomy; influence in the inter-
national system; solutions to problems; popular approval; the development of the 
state; and isolation.29 Status is an important underlying factor to all these orienta-
tions—either as an ultimate goal (states might crave power or influence to achieve 
or maintain a high status30) or as a source of social expectation (Great Powers 
might see being influential or a mediator as their duty because of their elevated 
status in international society).31
The concept of role orientation is vital to our discussion since it represents the 
highest order of strategic thinking in foreign policy. It raises the question: what 
role orientation does the UK want to adopt, given the economic pressures it faces 
and the emergence of rival powers in the international system? Since role orienta-
tion is closely linked to social structures, and is the ultimate expression of how 
a state interacts with the system, it would seem to be a particularly difficult level 
at which an actor could exercise agency. Material constraints (national capabili-
ties and relative power) as well as social structures (status and social interactions) 
combine to narrow the available choices.32 Switzerland cannot simply choose an 
expansionist role orientation. The United States would struggle to achieve isola-
tion, given the volume of its trade and interactions abroad. Nevertheless, role 
theorists have noted that policy-makers do have the opportunity to alter their role 
orientation provided the social and material constraints allow it.33 
The way governments pursue role orientations is by making choices from a 
range of more specific national role conceptions. The use of the term ‘choice’ is 
not intended to imply that this is always a deliberative process. The choice may 
at times be made for the policy-maker by social expectations. In his 1954 Reith 
Lectures, Oliver Franks confidently predicted that Britain would continue to be 
a Great Power, not as a result of ‘reflection’ and a ‘conscious decision’; rather, he 
suggested that: ‘It is part of the habit and furniture of our minds: a principle so 
much one with our outlook and character that it determines the way we act.’34 
Examples of national role conceptions include ‘balancer’, ‘defender of the faith’, 
28 Margaret G. Hermann, ‘Foreign policy role orientations and the quality of foreign policy decisions’, in 
Walker, ed., Role theory and foreign policy analysis, p. 134.
29 Hermann, ‘Foreign policy role orientations’, p. 134.
30 In his analysis from 1997, Alex Macleod argued that ‘the search for status still dominates the formulation of 
Britain’s international role conceptions’: ‘Great Britain: still searching for status?’, in Le Pestre, ed., Role quests 
in the post-Cold War era, p. 162.
31 See Ian Clark, ‘Towards an English School theory of hegemony’, European Journal of International Relations 15: 
2, 2009, p. 212.
32 As Wish notes: ‘Decision makers from large nations, in contrast to small ones, have a greater felt need to 
influence international affairs on a wider range of issues’; similarly, ‘Decision makers from nations that are more 
economically developed … perceive larger domains of national influence’: Wish, ‘National attributes’, pp. 97–8.
33 Chih-yu Shih, ‘National role conception as foreign policy motivation: the psychocultural bases of Chinese 
diplomacy’, Political Psychology 9: 4, 1998, pp. 602–603. A prominent example is the United States’ transforma-
tion from ‘isolated’ to ‘influential’ role orientation during and after the Second World War. Arguably, China 
is moving from a ‘developmental’ role orientation to either ‘active independent’ or ‘influential’.
34 Oliver Franks, ‘Britain and the tide of world affairs’: Reith Lectures, BBC Home Service, 7 Nov. 1954, http://
downloads.bbc.co.uk/rmhttp/radio4/transcripts/1954_reith1.pdf, accessed 10 April 2014.
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‘leader’ or ‘reliable ally’, among others.35 Role orientations are made up of ‘role 
sets’ or groups of such conceptions.36 Yet no single role orientation will encom-
pass all national role conceptions. That means there is always scope for reorienta-
tion if the pattern of conceptions shifts. 
The fact that role conceptions might point to different identities or policies 
also raises the prospect of role conflict. Rather than a purely negative process, 
role conflict can actually provide a mechanism for change in foreign policy and 
so is seen as a useful means of ensuring that policy evolves and is appropriate to 
the specific policy environment.37 However, conflicts can have damaging conse-
quences for policy and reputation if either internal or external actors reject one 
role in favour of another in a very public fashion. This highlights the importance 
of role performance or ‘role enactment’.38 Narrowing the analysis still further 
from the abstract to the empirical, role theorists examine how these conceptions 
are performed through particular policy choices and outputs—and how these are 
received. This process represents a powerful feedback loop, shaping the expecta-
tions of others in a way that could have an impact on future role orientations or 
national role conceptions. 
For illustrative purposes, I explore the role orientation of Britain as an influ-
ential actor in the international system in figure 2 below. The list of national role 
conceptions is not exhaustive: many others might have been added (e.g. regional 
protector, example to others, liberator). Each could in some way be expected to 
afford the UK influence over other international actors, but none automatically 
translates into favourable outcomes. For example, being a generous aid donor 
could enhance the UK’s identity as a positive influence on global development; but 
if British policy-makers sought to exploit this for political or economic  advantage, 
then others might object to that role as neo-colonialism or cynical self-interest.39 
In other words, this list of role conceptions and performances also contains within 
it the seeds of potential role conflict.
Clearly, then, this is not a closed system but a dynamic process of interpre-
tation, interaction and contestation that does not automatically relate roles to 
outcomes in a linear way. Nevertheless, in outlining a role orientation, as well as 
the role conceptions and performances that flow from it, we begin to understand 
35 For a list of potential role conceptions, see Holsti, ‘National role conceptions’, pp. 296–7.
36 Stephen G. Walker and Sheldon W. Simon, ‘Role sets and foreign policy analysis in Southeast Asia’, in Walker, 
ed., Role theory and foreign policy analysis.
37 James G. Rosenau, ‘A pre-theory revisited: world politics in an era of cascading interdependence’, International 
Studies Quarterly 28: 3, 1984, p. 270.
38 Cameron G. Thies, ‘International socialization processes vs. Israeli national role conceptions: can role theory 
integrate IR theory and foreign policy analysis?’, Foreign Policy Analysis 8: 1, 2012, pp. 25–46.
39 A recent example of this might be the attempt by Andrew Mitchell, Development Secretary from 2010 to 
2012, to portray aid to India as useful in securing defence contracts. Similarly, being a reliable ally of the US, 
through intelligence-sharing and military cooperation, is often perceived to bring influence: see Tony Blair, 
A Journey (London: Hutchinson, 2010), p. 410; Jack Straw, Last man standing (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2012), p. 
371. But, aligning oneself so closely with a state alleged to have broken international law and violated human 
rights has also led to charges of British complicity that have had negative impacts on the UK’s influence, 
particularly in Islamic countries: see e.g. Jamie Gaskarth, ‘Entangling alliances? The UK’s complicity in 
torture in the global war on terrorism’, International Affairs 87: 4, July 2011, pp. 945–64; Ruth Blakeley, State 
terrorism and neoliberalism: the North in the South (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).
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policy identities and behaviour in a more strategic manner. The next step for this 
article is to ask whether policy-makers could make a strategic choice as to which 
role orientation they adopt in order to further their national values.
Role theorists have tended to be cautious about the level of deliberate agency 
policy-makers can exercise when it comes to role-making and role-taking.40 
Lisbeth Aggestam asserts that acknowledging scope for agency ‘does not mean 
that we consider roles to simply be like hats that you can take on and off ’.41 
Nevertheless, as stated above, role orientations do change and policy-makers, as 
key interpretative actors, can contribute to shifts in understanding. As Martin 
Hollis and Steve Smith note, foreign policy-makers are sometimes able to achieve 
a level of ‘role distance’—that is, to find space to reflect on and interpret what 
roles are available and how they should be performed.42 Therefore, it does not 
40 For an exploration of these two concepts, see Sebastian Harnisch, ‘Conceptualizing in the minefield: role 
theory and foreign policy learning’, Foreign Policy Analysis 8: 1, 2012, pp. 47–69.
41 Aggestam, ‘Role theory and European foreign policy’, p. 18.
42 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, ‘Roles and reasons in foreign policy decision making’, British Journal of Political 
Science 16: 3, 1986, pp. 269–86. This is not to assume that policy-makers can adopt an ‘objective’ position. 
As Hollis and Smith put it (p. 277): ‘Role-distance can be thought of not as standing outside the play but as 
detached judgement within it.’
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seem  unreasonable to suggest that there exists the scope for British foreign policy-
makers to examine the range of potential role orientations available to a state such 
as the UK and explore the likely benefits and costs of each. 
What follows is a preliminary investigation into six such role orientations 
that feature prominently in recent debates over British foreign policy. These are: 
isolate, regional partner, influential (rule of law state), thought leader, opportunist– 
interventionist, and Great Power. In providing a preliminary sketch of each, I aim 
to offer a more useful platform for discussion on role orientation than the limited 
debate on whether the UK should align itself with the United States or Europe. In 
the process, I also aim to give a sense of the different policy directions that result 
from choices about role orientation.
Isolate
The ‘isolate’ role orientation is inward-looking, and involves expending as little 
energy and resources externally as necessary to allow states to focus on domestic 
concerns.43 In the British context, this image is usually evoked and then summarily 
dismissed. For example, Franks noted: ‘There are some who suggest that the … 
thing to do is to withdraw from world affairs and lead a quiet life on our island, 
democratic, contented, and reasonably industrious’, a position which he described 
as ‘impossible’.44 Throughout Britain’s history, there have been voices calling for 
the country to adopt a more circumspect, non-interventionist stance on particular 
regional or global issues. This ‘dissenting tradition’ commonly saw foreign policy 
as a conspiracy run by the aristocratic class.45 However, it was more often military 
intervention than involvement in international affairs per se which raised objec-
tions.46 
In the mid-nineteenth century, non-intervention was championed by the 
Manchester school of John Bright and Richard Cobden, two members of the 
British parliament. Bright protested against alliances with foreign powers as 
leading to ‘a system which binds us in all these net-works and complications, 
from which it is impossible we gain one single atom of advantage’.47 Bright’s 
fellow radical MP Richard Cobden launched a ‘no foreign politics’ campaign, 
which he asserted would ‘comprise every representative of our manufacturing 
and commercial districts’.48 This was designed to subvert the conduct of foreign 
43 See Naomi B. Wish, ‘Foreign policy makers and their national role conceptions’, International Studies Quarterly 
24: 4, 1980, p. 538.
44 Franks, ‘Britain and the tide’. Similarly, the 1998 Strategic Defence Review acknowledged: ‘We could of 
course as a country, choose to take a narrow view of our role and responsibilities which did not require a 
significant military capability … This is indeed a real choice’ (MoD, Strategic Defence Review, London: The 
Stationery Office, 1998, p. 23). But in the same paragraph, without elaboration, it decided this was ‘not one 
the Government could recommend for Britain’.
45 A. J. P. Taylor, The troublemakers (London: Hamilton, 1957).
46 Even so, this did not stop the dissenters from advocating intervention abroad on occasion: see Taylor, The 
troublemakers, pp. 33, 189. 
47 John Bright, ‘Principles of foreign policy’, reproduced in Edgar Jones, ed., Selected speeches on British foreign policy 
1738 to 1914 (UK: Kessinger Publishing, 2006), p. 194.
48 Richard Cobden, ‘England’, in John Bright, ed., Political writings of Richard Cobden (London: Cassell, 1886), p. 34.
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policy-making by elites and argued for ‘as little intercourse as possible between 
governments’.49 This is perhaps the nearest that British politics has come in the last 
two centuries to a movement advocating a non-internationalist role for the UK.
More recently, a growing public scepticism about the UK’s international duties 
is apparent in the fallout from the 2003 Iraq War and the 2008 financial crisis. In a 
2009 poll, 51 per cent of the public disapproved of the UK’s military involvement 
in Afghanistan and 57 per cent felt that the UK would not benefit from its actions 
there.50 In April 2011, 50 per cent of the British public polled disapproved of inter-
vention in Libya, with only 23 per cent approving—despite the limited nature of 
the operation.51 Opinion polling on intervention in the last two decades suggests 
that public support for military action can wane dramatically when casualties are 
considered.52 Similarly, support for development aid has declined as government 
budgets have been tightened, with those favouring an increase falling from 49 per 
cent to 35 per cent between 2008 and 2010, and 66 per cent believing the UK gave 
too much aid.53 This could hint at an emerging discourse in favour of isolation. In 
sum, a policy of reduced global commitment, particularly in respect of military 
action, would seem to be garnering public approval.
In its favour would be the immense financial savings to be had. Keith Hartley 
has estimated that Britain’s role as a global military actor costs around 1 per cent 
of GDP, equivalent to an annual price tag of £15 billion.54 The UK’s involvement 
in Iraq between 2001 and 2010 is reckoned to have cost £9.24 billion,55 and its 
Afghanistan campaign, £25 billion to May 2013.56 At a time when public debt is at 
unprecedented levels and major cuts to public services are being implemented, this 
is an unusually propitious time to argue for a more isolated role orientation for the 
UK in the international arena. A focus on economic prosperity and more produc-
tive non-military industrial activity would be likely to attract public support. 
However, the national role conceptions that might support a shift like this are 
sparse. The UK has been a prominent international actor for such a long time that 
there are few ‘scripts’ for an isolated UK that policy-makers can enact. By contrast, 
the national role conceptions of the UK as ‘influential’, through being a ‘reliable 
ally’ and ‘upholder of international law’, are recurrent themes.57 Cutting the 
defence budget substantially would imperil the UK’s relationship with the US—a 
49 Cobden, ‘England’, p. 34.
50 Jason Reifler, Harold D. Clarke, Thomas J. Scotto, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley, 
‘Prudence, principle and minimal heuristics: British public opinion toward the use of military force in 
Afghanistan and Libya’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 16: 1, 2014, pp. 28–55.
51 Reifler et al., ‘Prudence’.
52 See Jamie Gaskarth, British foreign policy (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p. 78.
53 Gaskarth, British foreign policy, p. 118.
54 Keith Hartley, ‘The economics of the Defence Review’, The RUSI Journal 155: 6, 2010, p. 5.
55 BBC, ‘Iraq War in figures’, 14 Dec. 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11107739, accessed 
10 April 2014.
56 Richard Norton Taylor, ‘Afghanistan war has cost Britain more than £37bn, new book claims’, Guardian, 
30 May 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/30/afghanistan-war-cost-britain-37bn-book. £25 
billion is the MoD estimate.
57 Hew Strachan, ‘The strategic gap in British defence policy’, Survival 51: 4, 2009, p. 51; Chris Kitchen and 
Rhiannon Vickers, ‘Labour traditions of international order and the dilemma of action towards Iran’, British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 15: 2, 2013, pp. 299–316.
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cornerstone of British strategic thinking since the Second World War. It would 
also cause friction with European neighbours, since it might threaten the future 
of NATO, as well as European defence initiatives that have been led by the UK 
and through which the UK has been able to express the national role conceptions 
of ‘regional leader’ and ‘positive European partner’. Although successive defence 
reviews, from the 1998 Strategic Defence Review to the 2008 National Security 
Strategy (NSS) and 2010 SDSR and updated NSS, have suggested that ‘there is 
today no direct military threat to the United Kingdom or Western Europe’,58 the 
US pivot to Asia, combined with a UK adoption of the isolate role, might lead 
to a revival of regional security threats.59 Russia’s actions in Georgia and Ukraine 
remind us that some states see military force as a viable tool for achieving foreign 
policy aims.
Moreover, even those discourses that at first glance seem to imply isolationism 
often in reality support an internationalist orientation. Cobden may have been 
critical of government-to-government interaction, but he also called for ‘as 
much connexion as possible between the nations of the world’.60 In doing so, he 
was advocating not isolation, but rather the development of people-to-people 
networks on an informal and hence non-governmental basis. Underlying this 
attitude was a belief that trade and human contact would spread peace.61 Similarly, 
more recent dissent over Britain’s membership of the European Union is usually 
framed as a desire not for isolation but rather for withdrawal from a role orienta-
tion of ‘regional power’ towards a more internationally influential role via trade 
with the wider world.62 
In other words, despite appearances, advocating a role orientation of isolate is 
unlikely to accord with the traditions and beliefs of the British public, or their 
elites.63 There is also the question of practicality: how feasible would it be for the 
UK to pursue a policy of isolation, given its membership of so many international 
organizations and treaty arrangements?64 The fallout from Britain’s reversing its 
involvement in NATO, the UN, the EU or, to a lesser extent, the Commonwealth 
would be severe. Overall, any effort to pursue a truly radical non-interventionist 
stance would face challenges not only from the militarist groups in British society 
but also from those in favour of regional integration and/or international organi-
zations, human rights and global civil society activists, and multinational firms 
pursuing a globalist agenda. In short, there is unlikely to be enough political or 
58 MoD, Strategic Defence Review, p. 9; Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy (London: TSO, 2008), p. 3.
59 Michael Rühle, ‘The future of the transatlantic security relationship’, American Foreign Policy Interests 35: 5, 
2013, pp. 283–7.
60 Cobden, ‘England’, p. 34.
61 Cobden, ‘England’, p. 36.
62 In his 2013 speech to his party’s conference Nigel Farage, the UKIP leader, asserted: ‘Only by leaving the 
union can we regain … our ability to trade freely with the fastest-growing economies in the world’, and 
described party members as ‘Open to the world. The opposite of insular’: http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/
coffeehouse/2013/09/nigel-farages-speech-full-text-and-audio/, accessed 10 April 2014.
63 Both Cobden and Bright lost their parliamentary seats in 1857 as a result of their anti-war stance: see Douglas 
Hurd and Edward Young, Choose your weapons (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010), p. 110.
64 According to the FCO website, the UK is involved in over 14,000 treaty arrangements: https://www.gov.uk/
uk-treaties, accessed 10 April 2014.
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social force to carry it through. Despite this, it is worth raising as a potential role 
orientation, if only to highlight the limits to policy-makers’ choices given the 
existence of longstanding alternative orientations premised on the idea of the UK 
as an active participant in international affairs.
Regional partner65
Given the economic crises that have affected the eurozone in recent years, combined 
with the political tensions in the EU over how to respond, it may seem strange 
to consider a role orientation that aligns the UK more closely with Europe. The 
rhetoric on all parts of the political spectrum in the UK is about renegotiation 
of Britain’s relationship with the EU to repatriate powers. Politicians want to 
reassert the UK’s autonomy from the forces of European integration and many 
seek a referendum to decide whether Britain’s membership of the Union should 
continue. Nevertheless, a role orientation that posits the UK as a regional rather 
than a global power has to be considered in the light of the rise of alternative 
centres of power in Asia and South America. At the end of the Cold War, a 
number of commentators advocated rejecting what they saw as the illusion of 
Britain as a Great Power with an international role in favour of an acceptance that 
the UK’s power had declined.66 Rather than cling to the coat-tails of the United 
States, an often capricious ally, Britain had to embrace its historical European 
identity and play a fuller leadership role in Europe. As a result, Britain would be 
able to have a more meaningful influence on events than it could in isolation or as 
a transatlantic groupie of the US.
65 Hermann originally termed this orientation ‘regional collaborator’ (Hermann, ‘Foreign policy role orien ta -
tions’). However, in recognition of the historical connotations of the word ‘collaborator’ in the European 
context, I here use ‘partner’ instead.
66 William Wallace, ‘British foreign policy after the Cold War’, International Affairs 68: 3, Autumn 1992, pp. 
423–42; Hugo Young, This blessed plot (London: Macmillan, 1999); Will Hutton, ‘Britain in a cold climate: the 
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Figure 3: Isolate role play
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British foreign policy-makers have periodically made efforts to put forward a 
national role conception of the UK as a longstanding European state. As foreign 
secretary, Jack Straw asserted: ‘We are a European nation, and always have been. 
Our monarchy was Danish, then Norman, then Dutch, then German.’67 For 
Straw, it was engagement with Europe that led to the UK’s international role 
in the first place. This narrative can be seen as flowing from a wider revisionist 
effort in academic circles during the 1990s to reconnect British history with its 
European past.68 But, as Timothy Garton Ash has noted, even though the material 
exists to create a European identity for Britain, ‘it cannot be the identity … The 
other identities are too strong.’69 In particular, the UK populace continue to 
associate themselves more with English-speaking countries, especially Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand, than with their European neighbours.70 Resistance to 
a regional orientation, and to a national role conception of Britain as European, 
is powerfully reinforced in public discourse by media images of the continent as a 
source of ‘un-British’ systems of government and laws as well as security threats 
from immigration.71 Despite the potential advantages in terms of regional and 
global influence that could flow from the UK’s embracing an orientation towards 
Europe, these seem to be counteracted by other orientations and conceptions that 
emphasize separation and distance. 
There is also a question mark over how far other EU member states would 
accept the UK’s playing a more integrated part in decision-making. The UK 
often enacts the role of ‘awkward partner’ in a European context that is useful to 
other states in a number of ways.72 When Britain opposes more EU regulation or 
political integration, it advances the argument for a more diverse form of commu-
nity based on liberal economic principles. Other states that share this vision can 
leave the UK to suffer the political cost of being labelled ‘awkward’ and present 
their own concerns as reasonable in contrast to UK intransigence. Meanwhile, 
those favouring integration can dismiss alternative visions of Europe as Euros-
cepticism along British lines. Furthermore, depending on the direction in which 
the UK wished to take the European Union, a more regional role orientation 
could alienate either France and Germany—if the UK were seen as muscling in 
on their traditional leading partnership—or the other member states—if a troika 
of France, Germany and the UK were seen as dominating the community. This 
reminds us that regional and international societal expectations about roles might 
hamper efforts to change a country’s orientation.
67 Jack Straw, ‘Pursuing an active and engaged foreign policy’, speech in the House of Commons, London, 22 
June 2001: Hansard (Commons), vol. 370, cols 281–291.
68 Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Is Britain European?’, International Affairs 77: 1, Jan. 2000, pp. 1–13.
69 Garton Ash, ‘Is Britain European?’, p. 13.
70 Chatham House/YouGov survey, British attitudes towards the UK’s international priorities (London: Chatham 
House, July 2010), p. 2.
71 Oliver Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945: historiographical perspectives on integration (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2004); Anthony Forster, Euroscepticism in contemporary British politics (London: Routledge, 
2002).
72 Stephen George, The awkward partner: Britain in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998).
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Influential (rule of law state)
The next role orientation the UK might pursue is that of being an influential 
power, with an emphasis on the national role conception of being an upholder 
of international law. Since the UK already has a high status in global politics, 
via its institutional memberships and relative prosperity, it clearly benefits from 
the existing arrangement of international society. It could therefore carve out a 
niche for itself as a constructive member of that society wishing to preserve the 
status quo. The role of being a status quo power has been at the core of Britain’s 
self-identity for centuries. The nineteenth-century German Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck described Britain as one of les satisfaits,73 a state that was happy with its 
position in world affairs and would not seek radical reform of the prevailing inter-
national order. In his famous 1907 memorandum, Sir Eyre Crowe asserted that: 
‘England, more than any other non-insular Power, has a direct and positive interest 
in the maintenance of the independence of nations.’74 Given its imperial past and 
recent interventionism, other states could justifiably critique the idea of Britain 
73 D. C. M. Platt, Finance, trade, and politics in British foreign policy, 1815–1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 
354.
74 Eyre Crowe, ‘Memorandum on the present state of British relations with France and Germany’, 1 Jan. 1907, 
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Memorandum_on_the_Present_State_of_British_Relations_with_France_
and_Germany, accessed 13 April 2014.
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as a longstanding supporter of the norms of sovereignty and non- intervention 
so central to international law (and order). However, this role conception proved 
useful in providing a rationale for the UK’s involvement in both world wars, the 
Korean War in 1950 and the Falklands War in 1982.75
In addition, the idea of upholding international law and preserving the essen-
tial character of the states-system is likely to be attractive to other actors, such as 
the rising powers of Brazil, China and India. These states are very protective of 
the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, particularly when it comes to 
their own national values and interests. UK support for liberal interventionism 
and preventive war has caused concern in these quarters. This reminds us that 
choosing between role orientations, and their underlying national role concep-
tions, should involve consideration of how such choices will be received by the 
wider international community. If Britain is to exert influence in the coming 
decades, it will increasingly have to co-opt the rising powers into accepting British 
assumptions about policy priorities and appropriate forms of action. Emphasizing 
national role conceptions for the UK that accord with their values, such as ‘status 
quo power’, ‘upholder of international law’ or ‘multilateralist’, would help to 
facilitate these relationships. 
The role performances that might flow from these conceptions include doing 
the basics of international diplomacy: drafting papers and legal treaties, hosting 
conferences, conducting observer missions, verifying commitments and offering 
expertise. These are already acknowledged as being particular strengths of British 
foreign policy. Lord Malloch-Brown has suggested that despite the furore over its 
involvement in the 2003 Iraq invasion, Britain was still seen in the UN as ‘in all 
other ways, very active—with all the first-class ambassadors and first-class staff in 
New York, sending some of our best diplomats, you know just working the UN 
with a seriousness that, say, the US didn’t do’.76 This is also a role that fits with 
Britain’s self-identity as being a constructive member of international society. 
A commitment to multilateral institutions has been a mainstay of a number of 
British strategy documents over the past decade.77 In its 2012 annual report, the 
FCO boasts that: ‘The UK continues to believe that a rules-based system is the 
best way to promote British interests … The FCO has been active in ensuring that 
international institutions are effective.’78 One could imagine the UK playing a 
useful part in international society by providing diplomatic expertise and financial 
support for the institutions of global governance—and, in the process, moving 
away from the more militaristic role performances of recent decades.
75 David M. McCourt, ‘Role-playing and identity affirmation in international politics: Britain’s reinvasion of 
the Falklands, 1982’, Review of International Studies 37: 4, 2011, pp. 1599–621.
76 Interview with the author, 2010.
77 See e.g., FCO, UK international priorities (London: TSO, 2003), p. 24; Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy 
(2008), pp. 9, 47; Cabinet Office, A strong Britain in an age of uncertainty: National Security Strategy of the UK, Cmd 
7953 (London: TSO, 2010), p. 10.
78 FCO, Annual report and accounts 2011–12 (London: TSO, 2012), p. 4. Evans and Steven assert: ‘Britain already 
excels at the nuts and bolts of foreign policy. Few governments are better at coordinating a UN Security 
Council Resolution or a summit communiqué, at getting candidates into senior international jobs, or at the 
day-to-day work of managing bilateral relationships or administering aid spending’: Alex Evans and David 
Steven, Organizing for influence: UK foreign policy in an age of uncertainty (London: Chatham House, 2010), p. 15.
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However, maintaining the existing institutions of international law and society 
in aspic is not sustainable in the long term. For one thing, there are continuing calls 
for reform of key international organizations such as the World Trade Organiza-
tion, the World Bank/IMF and the UN Security Council. Thus, being a status quo 
power and upholder of international law means, in practice, managing continual 
pressures for change. There is also the thorny question of when intervention is 
required to uphold the law. When Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne advocated 
Britain’s taking the role of ‘good international citizen’ in the 1990s, they left open 
the possibility of transgressing international law to promote human rights.79 One 
could see here a straightforward role conflict between the role conceptions of 
‘human rights defender’ and ‘upholder of international law’; but it might also 
be interpreted as a conflict internal to the latter role, over whether international 
criminal law and human rights conventions should be upheld over legal norms of 
sovereignty and non-intervention. 
In the past decade, there has been a great deal of controversy over what kinds 
of action are required to maintain the status quo of a rules-based international 
system. The UK’s involvement in the Iraq conflict in 2003 was justified by Tony 
Blair on the basis that Saddam Hussein had breached 17 UN Security Council 
resolutions and that the credibility of international law and the UN system was 
at stake.80 Opposing this view among the permanent members of the Security 
Council were China, Russia and France, who felt that Iraq had been contained 
and did not pose an imminent threat to international peace and security. The 
political fallout from these conflicting interpretations of the role of ‘upholder of 
international law’ was considerable.
The coalition government sought to resolve tensions over the use of force 
through an emphasis on achieving an international consensus in favour of action. 
Discussing intervention in Libya in 2011, Cameron defined his three essential criteria 
that would have to be met as a basis for action as: ‘Demonstrable need. Regional 
support. And a clear legal basis.’81 The inclusion of regional support and a ‘clear’ 
legal position as vital factors was designed to distinguish this basis for decision from 
that applied in respect of Iraq in 2003. Through substantial diplomatic effort, the 
UK and its allies had been able to gain the approval (or acquiescence) of all the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as that of the African 
Union and Arab League, for military action to halt the abuses of the Gaddafi 
regime. This appeared to signal a revival of the idea that intervention could be used 
for humanitarian purposes82—with the UK spearheading this initiative.
Yet in August 2013 the UK was again contemplating military action against 
the wishes of Russia, China and some regional actors, this time over Syria’s use 
of chemical weapons. When two motions to act were opposed in the House of 
79 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, ‘Good international citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy’, 
International Affairs 74: 4, 1998, pp. 847–70.
80 Tony Blair, motion for war, 18 March 2003, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/
vo030318/debtext/30318-06.htm, accessed 10 April 2014.
81 ‘Libya: David Cameron statement on UN resolution’, 18 March 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-politics-12786225, accessed 10 April 2014.
82 Thomas G. Weiss, ‘RtoP alive and well after Libya’, Ethics and International Affairs 25: 3, 2011, pp. 287–92.
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Commons, a brief flurry of debate emerged about what this would mean for 
Britain’s influence in the world, with some seeing the parliamentary outcome as 
symptomatic of a retreat from the role orientation of ‘influential’ and national role 
conception of ‘reliable ally’ of the United States.83 Nevertheless, polls suggested 
a hardening of the public attitude against the use of force.84 When a subsequent 
deal was brokered between Russia and the US, encouraging Syria to relinquish its 
chemical weapons, the UK was sidelined by both parties as neither a likely military 
belligerent nor a mediator for peace. Therefore, we can see that trying to fulfil 
a role orientation that does not accord with the views of the British public—or 
key actors in the global arena—has profoundly negative consequences. If the UK 
government had stuck to its earlier requirements of a clear legal basis and regional 
support, this role conflict might have been avoided. Such consistency would also 
have provided greater clarity for allies in predicting when they could rely on UK 
support.
83 See ‘Syria crisis: “Britain shouldn’t turn its back on world”, says Osborne’, Telegraph, 30 Aug. 2013, http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/georgeosborne/10275655/Syria-crisis-Britain-shouldnt-turn-its-back-
on-world-says-Osborne.html; ‘Is Paddy Ashdown right that Britain is now a “hugely diminished country”?’, 
Guardian, 30 Aug. 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/poll/2013/aug/30/paddy-ashdown-syria-
comments-poll, both accessed 10 April 2014.
84 Will Dahlgreen, ‘Opposition to Syria intervention hardens’, 4 Sept. 2013, YouGov, http://yougov.co.uk/
news/2013/09/04/opposition-missile-strikes-69/, accessed 10 April 2014. Within a week, the proportion of 
those polled opposed to missile strikes against Syria rose from 50 per cent to 69 per cent.
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Thought leader85
A recent reappraisal of the UK’s international position has argued that the UK 
should aspire to be a ‘thought leader’. According to this logic, the UK’s declining 
influence means that its capacity to respond to risks and shape outcomes in 
global politics will depend on whether other states and transnational actors can 
be persuaded to take action. As Alex Evans and David Steven put it, the UK 
will need to ‘adopt and excel in the role of thought leader, recognizing that it will 
often have greater comparative advantage in this area than in the “endgame” on 
key risks, where larger powers will tend to dominate’.86 They see, in addition to 
providing creative thinking and actively promoting innovations in world politics, a 
supporting role for the UK in the thought leadership of others, ‘acting as a convenor 
for debate, discussion and dialogue’.87 On a practical level, the role of thought 
leader would involve creating shared awareness of risks, as well as shared platforms 
and operating systems to campaign for change and manage the risks identified. 
How far this idea constitutes a role orientation in its own right, rather than 
a national role conception within the role set of the ‘influential’ orientation, is 
debatable. In a discussion on the concept at Chatham House, one of the contribu-
tors argued that thought leadership should be seen as ‘part of a systematic shift 
in an approach to global affairs, not a tactical way to deliver in the national 
interest, because then you are instrumentalising again, and you can’t align your 
forces around a kind of narrow definition of an interest. These are just bigger 
coalitions.’88 This implies that thought leadership can be seen as a role orienta-
tion. Acting as a thought leader is about identifying risks and solutions that affect 
the international community as a whole. In this way, the UK would become a 
problem solver, working to further global public goods. While it would derive 
some kudos from drawing attention to problems and coordinating responses, the 
subsequent action would need to be in the group interest. This could provide an 
overarching orientation to policy-making. However, it would also be likely to 
contain the seeds of role conflict since, at times, self-interest would have to prevail.
That said, being a thought leader would seem to fit naturally with aspects of 
Britain’s self-identity in world politics. The UK is a prominent norm entrepre-
neur. It was instrumental in creating an International Criminal Court in 1998 
and supported a ban on landmines under the auspices of the Ottawa Treaty. It 
provided a platform for discussion on African development and debt relief via its 
presidency of the G8 in 2005 and has been at the forefront of efforts to elevate 
climate change as a major security issue.89 These activities have afforded the UK 
85 This role is similar to that of ‘mediator–integrator’ in Hermann’s typology, an orientation in which policy-
makers are ‘genuinely interested in seeing that problems are solved’: ‘Foreign policy role orientations’, p. 138.
86 Evans and Steven, Organizing for influence, p. 14.
87 Evans and Steven, Organizing for influence, p. 14.
88 Nick Mabey, ‘The UK and the world: session 4’, Chatham House, London, 13 July 2010, p. 10, http://www.
chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/130710ukrole_4.pdf, accessed 
13 April 2014.
89 See Alex Evans, remarks in Alex Evans, David Steven and Robin Niblett, ‘UK and the world: governing in an age 
of uncertainty’, transcript of seminar, Chatham House, London 9 June 2010, p. 18, http://www.chathamhouse.
org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/09062010alexevansetal.pdf, accessed 13 April 
2014. 
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a prominent position in global debates. In essence, they are a form of ‘activist’ 
diplomacy.90 Indeed, the 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) annual 
report states: ‘Our aim is to pursue an active and activist foreign policy.’91 Perhaps 
one of the most overt examples of this approach has been the FCO’s campaign 
to prevent rape and sexual violence in conflict zones. William Hague launched 
this initiative in May 2012 with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees special 
envoy, Angelina Jolie, and the two travelled to the Democratic Republic of Congo 
in March 2013 to raise awareness of this phenomenon prior to the G8 meeting, 
at which Hague argued for a new international protocol to fight impunity for 
these crimes.92 The result was the prominent endorsement of a ‘Declaration on 
Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict’ by G8 foreign ministers on 11 April 2013.93
Such an initiative is comparatively uncontroversial, since it is unlikely to 
impinge on the core national interests of other states and is clearly to the advan-
tage of weaker members of society. An activist foreign policy could become 
more problematic if it seemed to be promoting sectional interests over those of 
90 For a discussion on the limits of an activist approach, see Robert Jackson, The global covenant (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 139.
91 FCO, Annual report and accounts 2011–12, p. 3.
92 FCO, ‘William Hague and Angelina Jolie visit Eastern DRC’, press release, 25 March 2013, http://www.
politicshome.com/uk/article/75120/fco_william_hague_and_angelina_jolie_visit_eastern_drc.html, 
accessed 10 April 2014.
93 FCO, ‘G8 foreign ministers’ meeting statement’, 11 April 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
g8-foreign-ministers-meeting-statement, accessed 10 April 2014.
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the wider community of the UK. An NGO can argue for action over human 
rights violations in Syria, for example, on the basis that its purpose is to encourage 
global action against such crimes. The focus of its interest is on the individuals 
being abused. However, policy-makers have to consider the interest of their own 
community first. Should they risk the lives of British soldiers to intervene in a 
civil war? What would be the wider implications of British involvement and how 
might this affect the security of British citizens and British economic assets in 
the region? An activist foreign policy might also run the risk of losing sight of 
‘grand strategy’ or broader interests in favour of short-term initiatives. Being a 
‘thought leader’ is an interesting notion, but it is not clear whether such a concept 
is sustainable as a guiding role orientation for the state. It does not really provide 
much in the way of guiding principles as to what the UK should be prioritizing, 
and arguably underplays the potential for conflict between communitarian needs 
and global public goods.
Opportunist–interventionist
The role orientation of opportunist was originally intended by role theorists to 
describe those statespeople and governments that seek public support and acclaim 
in international affairs.94 For the purposes of this article, I would like to adapt the 
term to refer to those who seek to exploit current disruptions in the international 
system to advance liberal ideas about human rights, democracy and good gover-
nance, even at the expense of existing frameworks of international law. The New 
Labour governments of Tony Blair were exemplary in this regard.
Since 1997 the UK has enacted the role of opportunist–interventionist power 
extensively, engaging in military action in Iraq (twice), Kosovo, Sierra Leone and 
Libya.95 This role orientation is, I would argue, a radical change from previous 
role-taking behaviour. New Labour’s foreign policy predecessors such as Douglas 
Hurd may have implied that intervention in Kosovo was a natural progression 
from lessons learned after the Bosnian war;96 however, the case of Kosovo repre-
sented a major development in the use of military force to promote human rights, 
since it involved wide-scale bombing of a sovereign state and effective annexation 
of its territory. It is worth contrasting the 1991 Gulf War, which had the limited 
objective of restoring the sovereignty of Kuwait following aggression by its neigh-
bour, with the preventive war of 2003 against Iraq to eradicate a threat that had 
not yet materialized. The extent of public anger over the latter intervention is 
a strong indication that it broke with the expectations of behaviour held by the 
British public on how the UK should act abroad.97
94 Hermann, ‘Foreign policy role orientations’, pp. 138–9.
95 Intervention in Afghanistan was represented for the most part as self-defence, and so I exclude it from this 
category of role performance.
96 Douglas Hurd, The search for peace (London: Little, Brown, 1997), p. 211; see also David M. McCourt, 
‘Embracing humanitarian intervention: Atlanticism and the UK interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo’, British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 15: 2, 2013, pp. 246–62.
97 For examples, see Robin Cook, resignation speech, House of Commons, 17 March 2003, Hansard (Commons), 
vol. 401, cols 726–727; Simon Burall, Brendan Donnelly and Stuart Weir, Not in our name: democracy and foreign 
policy in the UK (London: Politico’s, 2006).
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Critical scholars could argue that the UK violated the sovereignty of many 
states during the Cold War.98 However, what have come to be dubbed ‘Blair’s 
wars’ were justified by reference to a rationale that sought explicitly to challenge 
prevailing ideas of sovereignty and non-intervention that were core compo-
nents of the UN Charter and international law. Between 1998 and 2003, the UK 
arguably ceased to be a status quo power and became a revisionist one.99 Its role 
orientation was transformed from that of a self-declared upholder of international 
law to that of a state wishing to subvert existing rules to create a new order based 
on  ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. Whether this was to the benefit of the UK is 
contestable. 
On the one hand, this role orientation did bring some measure of increased 
status to the UK, since it seemed to be shaping the agenda of global politics. It 
also reinforced the alliance with the United States. On the other hand, the oppor-
tunist–interventionist stance had a number of negative consequences. The UK 
was derided as the ‘poodle’ of the United States and arguably lost a sense of its 
own autonomy of action. Public support for military action wavered, and there is 
a sense that the British people may be tired of sacrificing money, effort and lives 
on crises that are remote from core British interests. In a 2010 Chatham House/
YouGov survey the public appeared to favour Britain remaining a ‘great power 
with a large army’ but one that would ‘cut the overseas aid budget and use foreign 
98 Mark Curtis, Web of deceit (London: Random House, 2003).
99 Barry Buzan, ‘China in international society’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 3: 1, 2010, pp. 5–36.
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policy solely to defend Britain’s national interest’.100 In other words, they wished 
to retreat from the role of an interventionist power. The sense that policy-makers 
were acting opportunistically rather than in measured response to external threats 
has also diminished trust in the intelligence services—something that could have 
important long-term repercussions.
Moreover, this is a role that has had a poor reception from rising powers such 
as China, Brazil and India. While these states may have benefited from the UK’s 
willingness to support action in places such as Libya and Mali, they are also acutely 
sensitive to western powers transgressing sovereignty and seeming to reprise their 
past roles as imperial powers. It is arguable that Britain’s role as an interventionist 
in Libya has allowed these states to ‘free ride’ on the back of western efforts to 
maintain regional security while benefiting from their own enactment of the roles 
of anti-imperialists or peaceful traders. A role orientation that comes with a high 
financial and reputational cost and at the same time benefits rival states would not 
seem advantageous to a state such as the UK which must make hard choices about 
how to fulfil its immediate national interests.
Great Power
The last role orientation, one that is perhaps only worth mentioning to underline 
how far it has faded from resonance in the UK’s self-identity,101 is that of Great 
Power. Franks was accurate in his prediction that the UK would try to continue 
to perform this role despite the end of empire. However, it has arguably proved 
unsustainable in the twenty-first century. Traditional Great Power  behaviour 
involved alliances and rivalries with other states in the pursuit of relative gains. 
It also implied the maintenance of a preponderance of power in key military or 
industrial sectors to afford a state competitive advantage in the event of war. 
The end of the Cold War brought an end to power blocs and made redundant 
European fears of major conflict. Interstate rivalry still exists, but it is for the most 
part economic rather than military power that counts in a world of dense multilat-
eral institutionalization. That is not to say that such behaviour might not return. 
Moscow’s recent interventions in Georgia and Ukraine could presage a future era 
of tense relations between Russia and Europe. However, the weak response of 
European powers to these interventions suggests they have little stomach for overt 
conflict. When it comes to Great Power competition in other regions, such as Asia, 
the population size and material resources of the rising powers are such that the 
UK could not compete with them even if it wished to do so. 
The 2010 SDSR could be seen as a final recognition that the UK can no longer 
play a Great Power role. According to Anthony King, retaining the capacity to 
deploy a division-sized force overseas was vital to a state’s continuing to belong 
100 Chatham House/YouGov, British attitudes. Meanwhile, elite respondents to the survey wanted ‘Britain to 
give up the attempt to remain a Great Power and instead to seek influence in today’s world by setting a good 
example—with an ethical foreign policy and large overseas aid budget’.
101 A possible exception is Justin Morris, ‘How Great is Britain? Power, responsibility and Britain’s future global 
role’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 13: 3, 2011, pp. 326–47. 
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to the ‘elite club of great powers’.102 The SDSR has reduced Britain’s capacity to 
intervene abroad to that of a brigade, and as such effectively ended the UK’s ability 
to deploy, long term, the sort of force used in the Gulf Wars in 1991 and 2003. 
The fact that these commitments were justified as part of Britain’s obligations as 
a major power to uphold international law indicates that this is not a role which 
policy-makers wish to fulfil in the future. The SDSR suggests that from now on 
operations will only be conducted with allies, and so force levels can be reduced 
without a loss of influence. However, a key part of the assessment of a Great 
Power is its capacity to act independently.103 Even if the UK tends to act in concert 
with others, its contribution has historically been large and this was attributable to 
its desire to play the part of a ‘Great Power’ in world politics. Financial constraints 
seem to have finally compelled a retreat from this role.
Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to explore some of the options available to foreign 
policy-makers when it comes to the UK’s role in the world. Although govern-
ments often talk about introducing a more strategic sense to policy formation, 
they tend to skirt round the choices entailed and fall back on outdated ideas and 
metaphors. Instead, I have attempted to engage in a kind of thought experiment 
whereby the UK is able to select for itself an overarching orientation towards 
the international system. Six ideal-type role orientations have been outlined, and 
some of the costs and benefits of choosing any one posited. Pursuing a particular 
102 Anthony King, ‘Having brigades will never deliver the same punch as a division’, Parliamentary Brief Online, 
no. 27, Oct. 2011.
103 John J. Mearsheimer, The tragedy of Great Power politics (New York: Norton, 2003).













	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  Role	  orientation	  	  	  	  	  Role	  conceptions	  	   Role	  performance	  


























expectations	   Pragmatic/	  
responsible	  power	  
Military	  power	  








outh user on 03 February 2020
Strategizing Britain’s role in the world
581
International Affairs 90: 3, 2014
Copyright © 2014 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2014 The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
role orientation could bring advantages. It might result in a stronger narrative 
about British identity that could galvanize public support at home for British 
foreign policy.104 In projecting this identity abroad, the UK could link foreign 
policy with the domestic community in such a way as to strengthen the sense that 
policy goals and behaviour were in pursuit of a genuinely collective or national 
interest. Behaving in a consistent fashion according to a defined script also allows 
foreign policy-makers to shape how Britain is viewed by others and to build 
trust in the UK’s interactions abroad.105 Moreover, identifying the links between 
identity, strategy and action gives a clearer framework for devising policies. In the 
process, it may be possible to deploy resources more strategically in the service of 
policy goals. 
Of course, strategic thinking needs to continually reflect upon and challenge 
assumptions, responding to the test of practical experience. Policy-makers should 
not be distracted from immediate priorities in the dogmatic pursuit of an abstract 
role; rather, role theory should be seen as offering a means of interpreting current 
events in the light of their long-term implications. Nor should role conflict be 
avoided at all times if the result is that policy choice loses any flexibility, is out 
of touch with system changes or leaves the state open to exploitation by rivals. 
That said, if policy-makers are to exploit the potential benefits of strategizing and 
committing to roles, they may have to forgo short-term advantages that could lead 
to role conflict for the sake of the broader identities and interests role orientations 
embody. 
Policy-makers might be tempted to assume that the UK can adopt all or most 
of these role orientations at any one time. However, this fails to take into account 
the way in which role conflict can hamper the success of policy efforts. One 
cannot be an influential (rule of law) state and at the same time seek to transgress 
international law in an opportunist–interventionist fashion. Attempts to be an 
‘honest broker’ and mediator, in the thought leader mould, could be hampered 
if the UK was overly associated with roles underpinning the existing order, or 
with self-interested policy-making. Tensions over British foreign policy towards 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria arguably demonstrate the importance of strategizing 
Britain’s role in the world in a more systematic fashion. Becoming aware of role 
orientations, and the role conflicts that can arise within them, provides a good 
starting-point. 
104 House of Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, Persuasion and power in the modern world, 
28 Mar. 2014, HL150, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldsoft power/150/150.
pdf, accessed 14 April 2014.
105 Christopher Hill and Sarah Beadle, The art of attraction: soft power and the UK’s role in the world (London: British 
Academy, 2014), p. 8; Harnisch, ‘Conceptualizing in the minefield’, p. 54.
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